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Comments

UPMC Mergers Under Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
the Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws to
Non-Profit Hospital Mergers
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, rising health care costs and the resulting
cost-containment measures have generated a flurry of hospital
mergers. From 1981 to 1991, there were 195 hospital mergers in the
United States.' During the 1990's, there was a dramatic increase from eighteen mergers in 1993 to 735 mergers in 1995.2 With the
arrival of managed care, hospitals have formed together to become
more cost-efficient, to provide more diverse medical services, and
to increase their ability to give discounts to managed care
organizations in return for the managed care entity's promise to
3
direct a larger volume of patients into their hospitals.
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center ("UPMC") followed
this trend in 1996 with a merger spree that culminated in the
UPMC Health System, consisting of fourteen hospitals and ten
affiliated hospitals, representing forty-three percent of the
Pittsburgh region's acute care hospital beds. 4 UPMC also
1. See Amanda J. Vaughn, Note, The Use of the Nonprofit "Defense" UnderSection 7 of
the Clayton Act, 52 VAND. L REv. 557, 558 n.1 (1999) (citing Howard J. Anderson, AHA Lists
Hospital Merger Activity for 12-Year Period, Hosp., June 20, 1992, at 62).
2. See id. (citing Michael S. Jacobs, Presumptions,Damn Presumptionsand Economic
Theory: The Role of Empirical Evidence in Hospital Merger Analysis, 31 IND. L REV. 125,
127 (1998)).
3. See United States v. Mercy Health Serv., 902 F Supp. 968, 973 (N.D. Iowa 1995),
vacated as moot 107 E3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
983 F Supp. 121, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
4. See Pamela Gaynor, Top 50: A Decade of Change, PrrrsBURGH POsT-GAzErrE, March
14, 1999, at F5; Pamela Gaynor & Steve Massey, UPMC, Highmark Loom as Rescuers for
AGH, PrrrsauaGH PosT-GAzmE, Oct. 8, 1998, at Al. This acquisition spree also turned UPMC
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established its own health insurance plan, after Highmark Blue
Cross Blue Shield rebuffed UPMC's suggestion that Blue Cross
merge its health insurance plan with UPMC. 5 Critics of UPMC
suggested that UPMC was using consolidation to control the
market, thereby putting itself in a better position to resist price
reductions rather than to seek cost savings. 6 The Pittsburgh
Business Group on Health, consisting of thirty-seven local
businesses, threatened to raise antitrust concerns regarding UPMC
with the Federal Trade Commission, the United States Justice
Department, and the State Attorney General.7 UPMC responded that
its mergers underwent review by all necessary government
regulators and were found to be in full compliance with the
antitrust laws. 8 To date, there have been no antitrust cases filed
against UPMC.
This comment will focus on the legal process hospitals must
follow for approval of proposed mergers under the federal antitrust
laws and will explain the typical antitrust analysis employed by a
federal court when analyzing a proposed hospital merger. Part One
provides an overview of the applicable federal antitrust laws and
discusses the application of those laws to hospital mergers. Part
Two outlines the procedures and guidelines utilized by the
government authorities charged with the enforcement of the
antitrust laws, particularly with regard to hospital mergers. Part
Three discusses the prima facie case that the Federal Trade
Commission (or any government agency enforcing antitrust laws)
must make out, the possible defenses to a claim of antitrust
violation, and the factors the courts utilize in determining the
ultimate decision of whether to enjoin a proposed merger. Finally,
Part Four illustrates these principles with an analysis of a
hypothetical UPMC acquisition, including the steps and the
methods by which UPMC would get approval of the proposed
acquisition under the federal antitrust laws.
into the Pittsburgh region's largest employer. See Gaynor, supra, at F5. See also UPMC
Health System, Facts and Figures (visited July 10, 1999) <http://www.upmc.edu/Aboutl
Facts.htm>.
5. See Gaynor & Massey, supra note 4, at Al. Highmark's response was that insurers
and providers, due to their conflicting interests, should remain separate. See id.
6. See Gaynor, supra note 4, at F5.
7. See Pamela Gaynor, Business Group Goes After Highmark, UPMC, PrrTSBuRGH
PosT-GAzETrE, Sept. 24, 1998, at El.
8. See id.
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I.

OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICABLE ANTITRUST LAWS

The principal purpose of antitrust laws is to protect consumer
welfare by preserving competition in the market.9 There are two
federal statutes that are primarily 'responsible for preserving
competition in this country: The Sherman Act 10 and the Clayton
1
Act. '
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890 as the first antitrust law
passed in this country, sought to restrict competitors from
combining to create monopolies over products in order to suppress
competition. 2 The Clayton Act was later passed in 1914 due to
disappointment with the United States Supreme Court's rigid
interpretation of the Sherman Act, which made it too difficult for
the government to establish a violation.1 3 Although the language of
the two statutes differs, the standard for judging the lawfulness of
a particular merger under either Act is the same. 4 Both statutes, as
9. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
12. See 21 CONG. REc. 2456-60 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 319 (1897). The Sherman Act was originally
entitled "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and
Monopolies." See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894). It was renamed the
"Sherman Act" in 1976. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-435, § 305(a), 90 Stat. 1383, 1397 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in
pertinent part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Because Pennsylvania has no general
antitrust law, only federal antitrust law would apply to UPMC's acquisitions.
13. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282 (7th Cir. 1990).
Although the United States Supreme Court held railroad, oil and tobacco monopolies illegal
under the Sherman Act, the Court's language suggested it was too difficult to prove a
violation for the Sherman Act to be useful in preserving competition. See Rockford Memorial,
898 F.2d at 1282. The drafters of the Clayton Act responded by forbidding particular
anticompetitive practices upon a showing, not that they would, but that they may
substantially lessen competition. Id. Section 7 of the Clayton Act states in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (emphasis added) (original version at ch. 323, § 7, 38
Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914)).
14. See Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1281-82. Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids
transactions that restrain trade; Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids transactions that
substantially lessen competition. See id. at 1282. However, judicial interpretations of the two
statutes have converged. See id. A merger will be an "unreasonable" restraint on trade under

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:77

currently interpreted, forbid transactions likely to hurt consumers
by substantially lessening competition. 15 A violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, and thus Section 1 of the Sherman Act, requires
the reasonable probability, rather than the mere possibility, of a
16
substantial reduction in competition.
Because Section 7 of the Clayton Act initially applied only to
combinations resulting from stock acquisitions, some antitrust
defendants argued that it does not apply to non-profit entities,
which have no stock to acquire. 17 Courts held, however, that
Congress did not provide an explicit exemption for combinations
resulting from asset acquisitions by non-profit entities.'8 Because
corporations were attempting to avoid the constraints of the
Clayton Act by combining firms using asset acquisitions rather than
stock acquisitions, Congress amended sections 7 and 11 of the
Clayton Act to allow the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to
prevent asset acquisitions that would substantially lessen
competition in the market. 9 Today, a majority of courts hold that
the Sherman Act, using the rule of reason analysis, if it substantially lessens competition. See
id.; United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 846-47 (W.D. Va. 1989).
15. See Rockford Memorial, 898 F2d at 1283.
16. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F Supp. 121, 136-37 (E.D.N.Y.

1997).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994); Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F2d
1206, 1214 n.14 (11th Cir. 1991). There are three ways in which two companies may combine:
1) by a merger, where the target company is completely merged into the acquiring company;
2) by a stock acquisition (tender offer), where the acquiring company buys the stock of the
target company but keeps the target company at bay as a subsidiary; and 3) by an asset
acquisition, where the acquiring company buys the assets of the target company, which has
nothing left but cash that is often distributed to the shareholders in liquidation. R. J. Ricci,
Corporate Law, Second Semester, Week 10, at 10-16 (Spring 1999) (unpublished course
materials, Duquesne University School of Law) (on file with author). These three processes
are actually three different ways of doing the same thing. Id. See also Stephen H. Schulman
& Alan Schenk, Shareholders' Voting and Appraisal Rights in Corporate Acquisition
Transactions,38 Bus. LAw. 1529, 1529-1530 (1983).
18. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1214; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Freeman Hosp.,
69 E3d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1995); Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1280-81; but see Carilion,
707 F. Supp. at 841 n.l. As originally enacted, Section 7 applied only to stock acquisitions; it
did not provide for asset acquisitions. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1215 n.18.
Corporate lawyers discovered this omission and used asset acquisitions for combining
companies instead of stock acquisitions in order to avoid the Act. See id. The United States
Supreme Court, when faced with such a case, held that the Clayton Act did not apply to
asset acquisitions. See id. (citing Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
291 U.S. 587 (1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926)). In
1950, Congress closed this loophole in the Act by amending sections 7 and 11 to prohibit
asset acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. See id.
19. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1215 n.18. Section 11 of the Clayton Act
authorizes various federal agencies to enforce compliance with the Act, depending on the
industry in which the acquisition takes place. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (Supp. 11 1997). The
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to mergers (through asset
acquisition) of non-profit hospitals. 0
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS

The majority of merger challenges under antitrust laws are
brought by the FrC, the United States Department of Justice
("DOJ'), and state attorneys general. 2' Private challenges are rare
due to standing requirements and the lack of damages.2 2 The FTC
and the DOJ have prosecutorial discretion to enjoin an entire
transaction, to enjoin only the portion that raises competitive
concerns, or to enter into voluntary consent decrees with the
parties to the merger to eliminate the transaction's potential
anticompetitive effects. 23 If the FrC believes that any person,
partnership, or corporation has been or is using unfair methods of
competition, it may serve a complaint upon such entity and hold an
administrative hearing, after which the FTC will determine whether
the conduct in question violated antitrust laws.24 The FTC and the
DOJ may also bring civil actions in federal court to seek a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the consummation of transactions
25
they believe will suppress competition.
Under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 26 the parties to a proposed
merger must file a premerger notification with the DOJ and the
healthcare industry is not expressly addressed in the Act; however, after listing several
industries by name, the Act charges the FC with enforcement "where applicable to all other
character of commerce." Id. Courts have held that non-profit hospitals are an "other
character of commerce" subject to the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction under the
Clayton Act. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1214; Freeman Hospital, 69 F.3d at 266-67;
Rockford Memorial, 898 F2d at 1280-81.
20. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1214-15; Freeman Hospital, 69 E3d at 266-67;
Rockford Memorial, 898 F2d at 1280-81.
21. See Thomas L Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers
and Antitrust Law, 23 ANt J.L & MED. 191, 194 n.22 (1997).
22. Id. "Standing to sue" requires that the plaintiff has "been injured or been threatened
with injury" and "focuses on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight
the lawsuit" BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
23. See Jonathan Choslovsky, Note, Agency Review of Health Care Industry Mergers:
Proper Procedure or Unnecessary Burden? 10 ADwM. UJ. An U. 291, 299 (1996). The FTC
was formed by the Federal Trade Commission Act, which states in pertinent part: "A
commission is created and established, to be known as the Federal Trade Commission...
which shall be composed of five commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1994). Section 11 of the Clayton Act authorizes the Federal Trade
Commission to enforce its provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (Supp. III 1997).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 53(a)-(b) (1994) (granting power to Federal Trade Commission); 15
U.S.C. § 25 (1994) (granting power to Department of Justice).
26. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
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FrC. 27

Once the government agencies receive the notification, a
statutory waiting period of thirty days begins, after which the
parties may consummate the proposed acquisition.2 However,
during the statutory waiting period, the FTC can stop a pending
transaction by seeking a preliminary irunction in federal court, in
order to finish the FTC analysis of the transaction (which may take
29
longer than the statutory waiting period).
In 1984, the DOJ issued a document titled Merger Guidelines as
a roadmap to assist the government, as well as firms desiring to
merge, in determining the anticompetitive effects of proposed
mergers.3 ° In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC revised Merger Guidelines
27. Id. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, hospitals must file a premerger notification if
the following requirements are met(1) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting securities or assets are being
acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce;
(2) ....
(B) any voting securities or assets of a person not engaged in manufacturing which
has total assets of $10,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person which has
total assets or annual net sales of $100,000,000 or more; or
(C) any voting securities or assets of a person with... total assets of $100,000,000 or
more are being acquired by any person with total assets . . . of $10,000,000 or more;
and
(3) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold (A) 15 per centum or more of the voting securities or assets of the acquired person,
or
(B) an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired
person in excess of $15,000,000....
15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(l)-(3) (1994).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1994). The FTC or the Assistant Attorney General may
extend the statutory waiting period under section (e) of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act:
(1) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General may, prior to the
expiration of the 30-day waiting period . . . require the submission of additional
information or documentary material relevant to the proposed acquisition ....
(2) The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General ... may extend
the 30-day waiting period... for an additional period of not more than 20 days . . .
after the date on which the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney
General... receives from any person to whom a request is made under paragraph
(1) . . . (A) all the information and documentary material required to be submitted
pursuant to such a request, or (3) if such request is not fully complied with, the
information and documentary material submitted and a statement of the reasons for
such noncompliance. Such additional period may be further extended only by the
United States district court, upon an application by the Federal Trade Commission or
the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to subsection (g)(2).
15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1)-(2) (1994).
29. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
1991). In University Health, the statutory waiting period would have expired before the
conclusion of the FTC's adjudicative proceedings. Id. The FTC brought a preliminary
injunction action on the last day of the statutory waiting period. Id.
30. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) [hereinafter 1984 MERGER
GUIDELINES], reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 26,827 revised by U.S. DEP'TrOF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
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by issuing a joint document titled Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
which remains the current framework for merger analysis with the
exception of Section 4.0, which was amended in 1997.31 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines sets forth a series of steps that the DOJ and the
FIC follow in determining the competitive effects of a
transaction. 32 These steps include: (1) defining the relevant market;
(2) measuring post-merger market concentration and reviewing the
post-merger competitive characteristics of the industry; (3)
assessing post-merger ease of entry of new competitors into the
market; (4) evaluating the efficiencies resulting from the merger;
and (5) considering the failing firm claims of the acquired entity. 3
In 1997, the FTC and the DOJ elaborated on the efficiency analysis
(the fourth factor listed above) by amending section 4.0 of
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to recognize that mergers may
generate efficiencies in costs and resources, thus permitting two
ineffective competitors to become one effective competitor.34 The
government agencies, as well as the federal courts, evaluate these
five factors on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a
35
particular transaction violates antitrust laws.
In 1993, the DOJ and the FTC made it clear that the five-step
analysis outlined in Horizontal Merger Guidelines applies to
hospital mergers by issuing a joint statement titled Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in the Health Care Area
("Statements").3 6 However, the Statements provide a safe harbor
COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), reprinted in 1992 FrC LEXIS 176. Horizontal
mergers, such as hospital mergers, are mergers between competitors, in the same product
and geographic market. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES at § 3.0. Non-horizontal mergers, in
contrast, involve firms that do not compete in the same market. See id. at § 4.0.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 HopizoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], reprinted in 1992 FrC LEXIS 176 amended
by FED. TRADE COMM'N, REVISION TO HORZONTAL MERGER GumIENEs (1997), reprinted in 1997
FTC LEXIS 283 (amending only § 4.0 of the 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES).
32. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at § 0.2.
33. Id. These steps are also utilized by federal courts and are more fully discussed in
Part Three of this comment. See infra text accompanying notes 51-147.
34. FED.- TRADE COMM'N, REVISION To HORZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.0 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 FrC LEXIS 283. Mergers enable hospitals to combine assets and
personnel, so that the merged hospitals have one human resources department instead of
two, one laundry instead of two, and so forth. See id. By eliminating redundant services, the
hospitals can lower operating costs and thus offer lower prices and improved quality of
services. See id.
35. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at § 0.
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA § 1(B) (1993), reprinted in 4 Trade. Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,151 (1993), revised by U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF
ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATED To HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST (1994),
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provision for acquisitions of small hospitals, which are exempt
37
from the analysis in Horizontal.Merger Guidelines.
In addition to the FTC and the DOJ, the antitrust laws are
enforced by state attorneys general, who oversee merger
transactions within their particular states.m A number of state
attorneys general have entered into consent decrees with parties to
particular mergers, allowing a hospital merger to proceed on the
condition that the merged entity contribute a portion of the
prospective cost savings from the merger to public health
programs, charities, or other programs selected by the state.3 9 Such
consent decrees are consistent with the fundamental purpose of the
40
antitrust laws.- to protect consumers.

reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,152 (1994), revised by U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,153 (1996). These three documents, which
together constitute a comprehensive outline of the DOJ and FrC antitrust enforcement
policies with regard to the healthcare industry, are summarized in 4 JULIAN 0. VON KALiNOWSKI
ET AL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION ,§ 70.05 (2d ed. 1999). The current enforcement
policy is that hospital acquisitions will be analyzed under the principles contained in the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, except for acquisitions of small hospitals having
significant excess capacity and a reduced likelihood of surviving without the merger. See 4
JUULAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 70.05(1)(a) and
(1)(b) (2d ed. 1999).
37. See 4 VON KALINOWSKi ETrAL, supra note 36, at § 70.05(1)(a), The government
agencies will not challenge any merger between two general acute-care hospitals when one
of the hospitals is more than five years old, had an average of less than 100 licensed beds in
the last three years, and had an average daily inpatient census of less than 40 patients. See
id. These .small hospitals are usually located in rural areas and are not significant
competitors with other hospitals. See id. Also, these small hospitals, which are generally
unable to streamline services and personnel in order to run more efficiently, may achieve
such cost-saving efficiencies through a merger with another hospital. See id.
38. See Thomas L. Greaney, supra note 21, at 194 n.22.
39. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $
71,205, No. CV-95-2096, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20268 at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. 1995). The merged
entity was ordered to pass on at least 8096 of its net cost savings to consumers "in the form
of low-cost or no-cost health-care programs for the community or by reducing prices or
limiting actual price increases for existing services." Id. at *6.
40. See id. at *6-7. See also Columbia Healthcare Corp./HCA-Hosp. Corp. of America,
118 ET.C. 8 (1994). In Columbia Healthcare, the FrC charged that a merger between
Columbia Healthcare and HCA would substantially lessen competition. Columbia Healthcare,
118 F.T.C. at 10. The hospitals and the FrC resolved the situation by entering into a consent
agreement, where Columbia agreed to divest Aiken Regional Medical Center within 12
months after the order became final and for 10 years not to merge its remaining hospital
within that market' with any other acute care hospital in the market without prior approval
by the FrC. Id. at 15.
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III.

FEDERAL CASE LAW

This portion of this comment discusses the prima facie case that
the federal government agency must make out to make a claim of
antitrust violation. It also discusses the possible defenses to a claim
of antitrust "violation, and the factors the courts utilize in
determining the ultimate decision of whether to enjoin a proposed
merger. For the sake of simplicity, this portion presumes that the
FTC is the federal agency enforcing the antitrust laws, but the
analysis is the same whether the enforcement action is brought by
41
the FrC or the DOJ.
A.

The FTCs Prima Facie Case and the Burden-Shifting
Approach

Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act permits the
FrC to bring suit in federal district court to enjoin any transaction
that it believes violates or is about to violate antitrust laws. 42 In
determining whether to grant the FrC's request for a preliminary
injunction under Section 13(b), the district court must (1)
determine the likelihood that the FTC will ultimately succeed on
the merits, and (2) balance the public equities of the merger against
the private equities of the merged entity. 43 The FTC does not need
to prove irreparable harm, which is usually required for an
injunction, but instead must show a reasonable probability that the
41. Compare Federal Trade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 17422 (6th Cir. 1997) (analyzing an FTC complaint of antitrust violation
under a burden-shifting approach and considering product market, geographic market, expert
testimony regarding market share, efficiencies resulting from the proposed merger, and
ultimately weighing the equities) with United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F
Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (analyzing a DQJ complaint of antitrust violation under an
identical burden-shifting approach and considering identical factors).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994). This section provides in relevant part:
Whenever the [Federal Trade] Commission has reason to believe -- (1) that any
person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of
law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, and (2) that the enjoining thereof
pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is
dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the order
of the Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the
public - the Commission... may bring suit in a district court of the United States to
enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities
and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would
be in the public interest, and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond ....
Id.
43. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (11th
Cir. 1991).
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consummated merger would substantially lessen competition by
controlling the market."
F'C challenges to hospital mergers, as with all FrC antitrust
cases, are typically analyzed under a burden-shifting approach,
which shifts the burden of production of evidence between the
parties as each party produces evidence sufficient to establish its
claim or defense. 45 The FTC must first establish a prima facie case
of antitrust violation by showing that the particular acquisition
would produce a hospital that will control an undue percentage of
the relevant product market in the geographical area in question. 46
Once the government establishes its prima facie case, a
presumption of illegality arises, which the defendant must rebut. 47
A defendant may accomplish this by producing evidence showing
the inaccuracy of the government's market-share statistics, the ease
with which new competitors can enter the market, the trend of the
market either toward or away from concentration, and the
continuation of active price competition. 48 If the defendants
produce such evidence, the burden of production shifts back to the
FTC to produce additional evidence showing that the proposed
merger will raise prices for hospital services and thereby hurt
consumers. 49 However, the government as plaintiff retains the
ultimate burden of persuasion at all times.5 0
B. Factors the Courts Use in Antitrust Analysis of the Proposed
Merger
The following nine factors, all relevant in some way to either the
FTC's prima facie case or to the non-profit defendant's rebuttal, will
now be discussed in detail: (1) the relevant market, (2) the
concentration of market power, (3) the defendant's rebuttal of the
44. See id. at 1218.
45. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422, at *4-5.
46. See id. See also University Health, 938 E2d at 1218; Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'd 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17422 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D.
Iowa 1995), vacated as moot 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
47. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422, at *4-5; University Health, 938 F.2d
at 1218-19; Mercy Health, 902 F. Supp. at 976.
48. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422, at *4-5; University Health, 938 F2d
at 1218-19; Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 976.
49. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422, at *5; University Health, 938 F2d at
1218-19; Mercy Health, 902 F. Supp. at 976.
50. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422, at *5; University Health, 938 F.2d at
1219; Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 976.
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government's market statistics, (4) the significance of the non-profit
status of the merging hospitals, (5) the ease of entry of new
competitors into the market, (6) the community commitment of the
merged hospitals, (7) the merger's impact on managed care
organizations, (8) the cost efficiencies created by the merger, and
(9) the state action doctrine.
1.

The Relevant Market

A prerequisite for the FrC's establishment of a prima facie case
is the definition of the relevant market within which the merged
entity would operate. 51 The relevant market has two components: a
52
product market and a geographic market.
A properly defined product market includes any suppliers or
potential suppliers who can offer consumers a suitable alternative
to the defendant's product, and excludes any suppliers whose
product is too different to offer defendant's customers a suitable
alternative.5 If the consumer can reasonably substitute another
product or service for the defendant's product or service, then the
product or service will be considered part of the relevant product
market.54 A majority of hospital merger cases consider the relevant
product market to be "general acute inpatient hospital services,"
which excludes outpatient healthcare services offered by clinics
55
and other outpatient facilities.
The next step in the process is to determine the geographic
market the geographic area around the defendant where
51. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1289-90; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Freeman Hosp.,
69 F3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No.
98-3123, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *16 (8th Cir. July 21, 1999).
52. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1290; Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268; Tenet
Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *17.
53. See United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F Supp. 968, 975-76 (N.D. Iowa 1995),
vacated as moot 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
54. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 (E.D.N.Y
1997). For example, one fast food chain's hamburgers can be substituted for another fast
food chain's hamburgers in the eyes of the consumer, so they are part of the same product
market. In the hospital context, consumers can substitute in-patient services at one hospital
for another, so hospitals offering in-patient services are part of the same product market. See
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268.
55. See Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268; University Health, 938 F.2d at 1210-11;
Rockford Memorial, 898 E2d at 1283-84; Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 137-38; Mercy Health,
902 F. Supp. at 975-76; Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1290-91; but see United States v. Carillon
Health Sys., 707 F Supp. 840, 844-47 (W.D. Va 1989) (holding that because some inpatient
services could be obtained in a doctor's office or outpatient facility, the providers of such
services were thus competitors with hospitals for those services, and should be included in
the relevant product market), affd 892 E2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
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consumers can turn to alternative sources for a product offered by
the defendant and where the defendant faces competition.s In the
hospital setting, the geographic market is the area where
consumers can turn to other hospitals, should the merger be
consummated, for acute-care inpatient services.5 7 Determination of
the relevant geographic market is highly fact-sensitive and unique
to each case.5 However, under a two-part analysis known as the
Elzinga-Hogarty test, courts permit the use of expert testimony to
determine the relevant geographic market in a particular case.m
The first prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test determines the
geographic area served by the merging hospitals through an
examination of the zip codes of patients discharged from those
hospitals. 6° After accounting for approximately eighty percent of the
patients admitted to the defendant's hospitals, the expert who
conducted the test will use the zip codes to develop a preliminary
map of the service area.6' If other hospitals exist within that
geographic area, the expert will then examine zip codes of the
patient population at those hospitals to complete a map of the
collective service area of all the hospitals. 62
The second prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test requires an analysis
of where patients, determined to be within the geographic service
area, go to receive their health care.6 The expert will again use
patient zip code information to determine what percentage of the
people residing in the collective service area used hospitals within
56. See Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268; Tenet Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849,
at *17.
57. See Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268.
58. See Long Island, 983 F Supp. at 140; Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 271 n.16; Tenet
Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *18.
59. See Freeman Hospital, 69 F.3d at 264. The Elzinga-Hogarty test is a method devised
by two professors of economics, Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F Hogarty, to analyze
patterns of consumer origin and destination and thereby identify the competitors of the
merging entities. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. In Freeman Hospital, the expert examined the zip codes of patients
discharged from the three hospitals in Joplin, Missouri. Id. at 264. After he accounted for
approximately 80% of the patients admitted to those hospitals, he arranged the zip codes in
order of distance from Joplin and developed a preliminary map of the service area. Id. The
80% is the inclusion percentage of people in the area utilizing the hospital's business. Id. at
264 n.8. Elzinga and Hogarty originally determined that 75% was sufficient to define an
accurate service area. Id. Subsequently, they determined that 9096 was a more appropriate
cutoff. Id. The expert in Freeman Hospital chose 80%as sufficient to define the service area
because 20% of the patients utilized the Joplin hospitals for specialized services and
therefore were not representative of the hospitals' primary patient base. Id.
62. See id. at 264.
63. See id.
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that geographic area.6 Seventy-five percent of the people within the
area utilizing the hospitals within that area is a weak market for
the defendant's product (hospital services), while ninety percent is
a strong market.6 Within that market, the court will determine who
the defendant's competitors will be after the merger and what
percentage of the market the merged entity will control.6
2.

The Concentration of Market Power

Once the FrC establishes the relevant product and geographic
markets, it must show as another element of its prima facie case
that the proposed merger would result in a significant increase in
the concentration of power in the relevant markets, and that the
merged entity would control an undue share of those markets. 67 A
majority of courts use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") to
measure market concentration, the number of hospitals in the
market, and their respective market shares.6 The HHI is calculated
by squaring the market share of each competing firm in a market
and adding the resulting numbers.6 For example, in a market with
64. See Freeman Hosp., 69 F3d at 265. This is known as the "LIFO" ("little in from the
outside") measurement See id. at 264 n.9. LIFO measures the percentage of people within a
particular area who utilize the hospital services in that area, and thus determines the
frequency with which patients use hospitals outside the service area. See id. If patients use
hospitals outside the area, those hospitals become competitors of the hospitals within the
area and thus restrain the hospitals within the area from exercising undue market power. See
id.
65. See Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1292. These percentages are not absolute,
however. See id. The court in Butterworth held that 85% was sufficient to define the relevant
service area. Id. The court stated that once the 75% threshold is reached, the strength of the
proposed market cannot be determined by an arbitrary percentage cutoff but rather must be
evaluated after the consideration of all relevant data. Id. Often, the court will evaluate the
proposed strengths and weaknesses of the alternate geographic markets proposed by the
parties and adopt the stronger one. See id.
66. See id. at 1294. Once the relevant markets are defined, the court will determine
market concentration, which is a function of the number of competitors in the market and
their respective market shares. See id. Due to the complexity of determining market
concentration, this is discussed in a separate section of this comment. See infra text
accompanying notes 67-75.
67. See Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1294; Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health,
Inc., 938 F2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991).
68. See Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1294. The HHI is the most, prominent method of
measuring market concentration and has been included in the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. See 1992 HoPizorTAL MERGER GUiDEUNEs, supra note 31, at § 1.5.
69. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294; University Health, 938 F2d at 1211 n.12. The
HHI measures the distribution of market shares of the top hospitals and the composition of
the overall market. See 1992 HoRuzoNTAL Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, at § 1.5. Small
hospitals are not critical because they do not significantly affect the HHI. See id. at § 1.5
n.17.
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six firms with market shares of 30%, 20%, 20%, 10%, 10%, and 5%,
the sum of the squares of those market shares would be 1925,
indicating a highly concentrated market.70 A pre-merger HHI above
1800 reflects a highly concentrated market, and a merger producing
an increase in the HHI of more than fifty points in such a market
71
raises antitrust concerns.
In Federal Thade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corp.,7 2 the
district court used the HHI analysis to determine the defendant's
market concentration in two product markets: the market for
general acute care inpatient hospital services, and the market for
primary care inpatient hospital services. 73 The relevant geographic
market was the greater Kent County.7 4 The district court found that
the merged entity would control between 47% and 65% of the
market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, and
between 65% and 70% of the market for primary care inpatient
hospital services. 75 The court also determined that the post-merger
HHI would show an increase of between 1064 and 1889 points for
the general acute care inpatient market, and an increase of
between 1675 and 2001 points for the -primary care inpatient
market. 76 Based on these figures, the court concluded that both
relevant product markets would be highly concentrated after the
merger, and that the FTC succeeded in establishing a prima facie
case that the proposed merger would violate Section 7 of the
70. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1211 n.12. An HHI below 1000 reflects an
unconcentrated market. See 1992 HORIZONTAL Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, at § 1.5 n.17.
An HHI between 1000 and 1800 shows a moderately concentrated market, while an HHI
above 1800 shows a highly concentrated market. Id. An HHI of 10,000 reflects a pure
monopoly. Id.
71. See Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1294; University Health, 938 F2d at 1211 n.12. An
increase of 100 points in the HIll by any merger, to a post-merger level of 1000 or more,
raises antitrust concerns. University Health, 938 F2d at 1211 n.12.
72. 946 F Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd No. 96-2440, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422
(6th Cir. 1997).
73. Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1294.
74. Id.
75. Id. The defendant in Butterworth did not question these statistics and conceded
that the merger would result in a highly concentrated market, with the defendant having a
high market share after the merger. Id. Other courts, however, have interpreted such market
share data differently., See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No. 98-3123,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *18 n.10 (8th Cir. July 21, 1999) (holding that a market share
of 84% raises the inference of a monopoly, while a market share of less than 6096 is generally
not sufficient to create such an inference).
76. Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1294. The precise figures were: the post-merger HIl
would range from 2767 to 4521 points for the general acute care inpatient market,
representing an increase of between 1064 and 1889 points, and 4506 to 5079 points for the
primary care inpatient market, representing an increase of between 1675 and 2001 points. Id.
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Clayton Act.77
3.

The Defendants' Rebuttal of the Government's Market
Statistics

To rebut the FTC's prima facie case, some defendants have
argued that a high concentration in the hospital industry does not
necessarily result in anticompetitive effects such as price
increases. 78 In fact, the defendant in Butterworth offered expert
economic evidence that non-profit hospitals had a lower correlation
between higher market shares and higher prices as contrasted with
for-profit hospitals, and that non-profit market share is actually
associated with lower prices rather than higher prices.7 9 To support
this evidence, the defendant's expert reasoned that mergers create
economic efficiencies through the consolidation and streamlining of
80
clinical services, thus lowering the operating costs of hospitals.
Because the FTC's expert offered no evidence to contradict the
defense expert's findings, the Butterworth court found that the
defendant had successfully rebutted the FTC's presumption that
81
high market concentration resulted in anticompetitive effects.
Defendants have also attempted to undermine the FTC's market
share statistics by arguing that the target hospital was a weak
competitor with dim prospects for future success, so that the
proposed acquisition would not substantially lessen competition,
since there was no competition before the merger.82 The courts
have typically responded that the creation of monopolies and the
resulting loss of competition traditionally involved the acquisition
of the small and weak by the big and strong.83 The weakness of the
acquired entity is relevant only if the defendant can establish that
the weakness undermines the accurateness of the FFC's market
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1295.
79. Id.
80.

Id.

81. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
82. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health Inc., 938 F2d 1206, 1220-21
(11th Cir. 1991).
83. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1221. The court also stated that the acquired
firm's weakened financial condition was a poor justification for a merger, and that the
acquisition of a weak company by a financially strong one actually deters competition by
preventing others from acquiring those customers, making entry into the market by other
entities more difficult. Id. (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
652 F2d 1324, 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 1981)).
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share statistics, which are vital to the VI C's prima facie case.'
Of course, defendants can also challenge assumptions and
conclusions used by the government to determine the relevant
markets.8 For example, in United States v. Mercy Health
Services,86 the defendant argued that the government relied on the
assumption of a strong doctor-patient loyalty to determine the
geographic market from which the hospitals obtained their
patients.8 7 The defendant in Mercy Health successfully argued that
many of the hospitals' patients did not have an established
physician relationship, and that the health insurance plan used by
the patients' employers restricted the patients' choice of
physicians. 88 Thus, because the government's market analysis was
based on inaccurate assumptions and conclusions, it did not
establish its prima facie case that the defendant's merger would
substantially lessen competition. 9
Due to the lack of studies regarding the actual effect of market
structure characteristics on price competition in the hospital
industry, the market share characteristics that lessen competition
are often theoretical guesses, with the result that a determination
as to whether a particular merger will suppress competition
generally becomes a battle of the experts 0 Whether a defendant
will successfully rebut the FTC's prima facie case turns on the case
presentation and the qualifications and persuasiveness of defense
experts. 9'
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 978-79.
86. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997). By
the time the case reached the appeal stage, the hospitals had decided not to merge, so there
was no longer a live controversy. Mercy Health, 107 F3d at 637.
87. Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 978-79.
88. Id. In Tenet Healthcare,the Eighth Circuit agreed, stating that patients today do not
make choice of health care provider decisions based on loyalty to a particular doctor, but
instead such decisions are based on "whatever doctors or hospitals are covered by their
health plan." Tenet Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *28.
89. Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 987.
90. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 E2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
Because of inconclusive literature on which market structure characteristics lessen
competition, the court stated that the government need only "satisfy some minimum
threshold of persuasiveness and be better than the defendant's case." Rockford Memorial,
898 F2d at 1286.
91. See id.
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The Significance of the Non-Profit Status of the Merging
Hospitals

Although most federal courts agree that antitrust laws apply to
non-profit entities, defendants have used the non-profit status of a
merging hospital as a defense to the FTC's prima facie case.92
Specifically, defendants have argued that non-profit hospitals
operate in a different manner than for-profit businesses because the
boards of non-profit hospitals are comprised of community
business leaders who, as consumers, have an incentive to maintain
high-quality, low cost hospital services. 93 Therefore, the defendants
argue, non-profit hospital mergers are unlikely to arbitrarily raise
prices merely to earn higher profits since the governing bodies of
the merged entities are also their consumers. 94
Courts disagree on the merit of this defense. 95 The Butterworth
court, as well as the district courts in United States v. Carilion
Health System 96 and United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center,97 validated non-profit status as a defense, reasoning that the
board members, as consumers themselves, have a commitment to
community service rather than profit maximization. 98 However,
92. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296
(W.D. Mich. 1996), affd, No. 96-2440, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296. The Butterworth court was persuaded by a
study of California hospitals that because governing boards of non-profit hospitals were part
of the same consumer group to which hospital services were directed, a non-profit hospital
organization resembled a consumer cooperative rather than a monopoly of resources. Id.
94. See id. (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F Supp. 1213, 1222
(W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995)).
95. Compare id. at 1296-97 (explaining that non-profit status was a material
consideration in the defendant's rebuttal of the FTC's prima facie case) and United States v.
Carillon Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989) (holding that non-profit status
supported finding the merger reasonable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act), aff'd without
opinion 892 F2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983
F. Supp. 121, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that while non-profit status does not provide an
exemption from the antitrust laws, it may be considered if supported by other evidence that
such status would inhibit anticompetitive effects) with Federal Trade Comm'n v. University
Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (lth Cir. 1991) (holding that non-profit status alone was not
enough to rebut the government's prima facie case) and United States v. Mercy Health
Servs., 902 F Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot 107 F3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that because new and different board members could take control of the
corporation, there was nothing inherent in the structure of the corporate board of non-profit
entities to deter anticompetitive behavior) and United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898
E2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that there is no evidence that non-profit entities
are more likely to compete vigorously than for-profit corporations).
96. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va: 1989), affd without opinion 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir.
1989).
97. 983 F Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
98. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97; CarilionHealth, 707 F Supp. at 849; Long
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other courts have held that non-profit status alone is insufficient to
rebut the FTC's prima facie case.9 In Federal Trade Commission v.
University Health, Inc., 1°° the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
United States Supreme Court, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Board of Regents,0 1 rejected an argument that non-profit entities
are impliedly exempt from antitrust laws because they act under
such a different set of incentives than for-profit entities. 01 2 The
University Health court added that no evidence indicated that
non-profit corporations compete more vigorously than for-profit
entities. 1°3 Similarly, in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,1°
the Seventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in National
Collegiate and concluded that non-profit status was not a sufficient
defense to the government's prima facie case 0 5 Furthermore, the
district court in Mercy Health concluded that because the
composition of the board of non-profit entities changes, nothing
inherent in the board structure of non-profit hospitals operates to
06
deter anticompetitive behavior.
These recent court decisions demonstrate the uncertainty of
non-profit status as a defense to alleged violations of antitrust laws.
The significance of such a defense has been the subject of
controversy. 0 7 A demonstration to the court of the non-profit
hospital's continual commitment to community service, along with
evidence that the non-profit status of the parties involved will
encourage rather than deter competition would be the best
approach for the non-profit hospital that is an antitrust defendant.
The current uncertainty in the law suggests that the validity of this
Island, 983 F. Supp. at 146.
99. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1224; Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 989;
Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1285.
100. 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991)
101. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
102. University Health, 938 F2d at 1224 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984)).
103. Id. "We are aware of no evidence... that nonprofit suppliers of goods or services
are more likely to compete vigorously than profit-making suppliers." Id. (quoting Rockford
Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1285).
104. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
105. Rockford Memorial, 898 F.2d at 1285. The court explained that "[i]f the managers
of nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after that last penny of profit, they may be
less prone to engage in profit-maximizing collusion but by the same token less prone to
engage in profit-maximizing competition." Id.
106. Mercy Health, 902 F. Supp. at 989.
107. See Long Island, 983 F Supp. at 145 (explaining that "[tihe significance of
not-for-profit status in a Section 7 Clayton Act case is inclear, and has been the subject of
controversy by the courts and commentators").
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defense will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
5.

The Ease of Entry of New Competitors into the Market

Merged entities are unlikely to use their market power to raise
prices if new competitors can easily enter the market. 08 The
Horizontal Merger Guidelines look at whether entry of new
competitors would be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter the
anticompetitive effects of a completed merger. 1°9 The entry of a
new competitor is timely if it can achieve significant market impact
within an appropriate amount of time so as to counteract the
anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger. 10 The likelihood of
entry of new competitors refers to the probability that the entries
will be profitable, and thus viable competitors against the merged
corporation.' Finally, the new competitor must compete with the
merged entity to an extent that causes market prices to return to
their premerger levels."' In the hospital context, there are
substantial barriers to the entry of new competitors into the
market, such as state certificate of need laws, which regulate when
and where new hospitals can be built, based on public need." 3
Some courts have reasoned that certificate of need laws actually
encourage anticompetitive practices, in that merged hospitals that
have excess capacity possess both the i.'centive to oppose a
certificate of need for a new or expanding hospital and the
evidence - excess hospital beds - to show a lack of public need
for new services. 1 4 Where existing hospitals have been permitted to
expand and add new facilities, courts have been more likely to
uphold a proposed merger based on the likelihood of increased
108. See Butterworth, 946 E Supp. at 1297. If entry int,
the level of competition would keep market prices down, ,.
after the merger, could not profitably raise prices abovHORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at § 3.0.
109.

market is relatively easy,
the market participants,
.,remerger levels. See 1992

1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra noto 'J, at § 3.0.

110. Id. The DOJ and the FTC consider an entry into the mark.et timely if it "can be
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact" on consumers
and prices. Id. § 3.2.
111. Id. § 3.0.
112. Id. § 3.0.
113. See University Health, 938 E2d at 1219. Certificate of need laws regulate the
addition of new hospitals and the expansion of existing hospitals. See id. Because it is so
difficult for new or expanding hospitals to sufficiently justify a need for the proposed
services, certificate of need laws are substantial barriers to the entry of new competitors
into the relevant market, almost akin to statutory prohibition of new facilities. See id.
114. See id. at 1219-20.
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competition to the merging hospitals." 5
6.

The Community Commitment of the Merged Hospitals

In Butterworth, the district court was persuaded to permit the
proposed merger of two hospitals based (in part) on their
"community
commitment. "11
This
community
commitment
consisted of assurances given by the merging hospitals that they
would not exercise their market power to raise prices or otherwise
injure the community.1' 7 The hospitals argued that the purpose of
the merger was cost reduction, so that savings could pass onto
consumers, rather than raising prices to gouge consumers." 8 Under
the Butterworth analysis, an effective "community commitment"
consists of five parts: (1) the commitment to freeze fees for
services; (2) the commitment to freeze prices to managed care
companies; (3) the commitment to limit profit margins; (4) the
commitment to assist the medically needy; and (5) the commitment
to govern the merged entity in the best interests of consumers." 9
The defendant in Butterworth was willing to enter into a consent
decree to make this community commitment legally binding if the
merger was allowed to proceed. 120 Although the FTC questioned the
adequacy and enforceability of the community commitment, the
court determined that the defendant's assurances indicated a
serious commitment, to which they could be held legally
accountable, to refrain from using their market power to raise
12
prices and injure consumers. '
Other courts have also been persuaded by such assurances from
the non-profit defendant. The court in Long Island noted that the
defendant hospitals had entered into an agreement with the
Attorney General of New York to pass cost savings incurred from
the merger over the next five years to consumers, and to use part
of the cost savings to offer high quality health care services to the
elderly and economically disadvantaged members of the
115. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y
1997). The court in Long Island was persuaded by the evidence that an existing hospital,
New York Hospital Queens, had recently added a cardiac surgery department, already offered
cancer services, and would soon become a leading teaching and specialized care hospital. Id.
Also, other hospitals were expanding their services into the relevant market. Id.
116. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1298.
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community.122 Attorneys

general

of many states have

allowed

proposed mergers to proceed based on such consent decrees
signed by merging hospitals. 123
7.

The Merger's Impact on Managed Care Organizations

Historically, hospitals competed primarily on the basis of range
and quality of services. 2 4 However, with the arrival of managed
care in the last ten to fifteen years, hospitals have begun to
compete more on the basis of price. 25 The managed care
organizations promise to direct patients to particular hospitals in
exchange for the lowest price. 26 The managed care organizations

negotiate the best possible rates and discounts with area hospitals
and

then

determine

the

premiums

they

must

charge

their

subscribers.127
Antitrust defendants have argued that because managed care
companies have the upper hand in negotiating prices with the

hospitals, the managed care companies are actually the
"consumers," so the merged corporation would not have much
anticompetitive effect. 28 Courts have responded, though, that
managed care companies are not themselves buyers but rather
third-party payors acting on behalf of individuals, who are the

ultimate consumers. 129 The managed care organizations could not
refuse to reimburse their subscribers for medical services because
market prices were too high; they would instead reimburse their

patients for medical services and then pass the increased costs to
individual consumers through larger premiums. 30 Therefore, many
courts are not persuaded that the existence of sophisticated
purchasers in the health care market, such as managed care
122. Long Island, 983 F Supp. at 149.
123. See Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,205,
No. CV-95-2096, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20268 at 2-3 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
124. See United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 973 (N.D. Iowa 1995),
vacated as moot 107 E3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
125. See Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 973.
126. See Long Island, 983 F.Supp. at 128.
127. See Mercy Health, 902 F Supp. at 974.
128. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.13
(lth Cir. 1991). The argument is that managed care organizations are actually the effective
buyers of most hospital services rather than the patients who are the buyers in name only.
See Hospital Corp. of America v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986).
The managed care organizations are the ones who pay for the hospital services on behalf of
their subscribers. See id.
129. See University Health, 938 F2d at 1213 n.13; Hospital Corp., 807 F2d at 1391.
130. See University Health, 938 E2d at 1213 n.13.
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organizations, will keep prices low and sustain competition in the
131
market after a consummated merger.
Other courts, however, have determined that hospitals have been
forced to merge because of control of the health care market
possessed by managed care entities, and the decrease in frequency
and length of hospital stays that resulted from this control.'32
Courts have also noticed that due to managed care subscribers
receiving reduced fees, hospitals have been forced to charge higher
prices to those consumers who purchase health care insurance
independently or who are covered through employers that do not
use managed care insurance. 13 Some courts have concluded that
the streamlining of services and cost efficiencies created by
hospital mergers would likely avoid such cost-shifting to
non-managed care subscribers, and thus benefit consumers as a
whole.'3 Therefore, while courts have used the existence of
managed care as a factor in the antitrust analysis of mergers, they
disagree on the impact managed care has on competition and how
it affects consumers in the particular market.
8.

The Cost Efficiencies Created by the Merger

Both government agencies and the courts recognize cost
efficiencies as a valid justification for a proposed merger.135 In their
1997 Revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the FTC and
the DOJ recognized that mergers can generate significant operating
efficiencies by streamlining assets and enabling the merged entity
to lower costs while producing the same quantity and quality of
36
services.1
A majority of courts recognize the efficiency defense for
upholding a proposed merger. 13 Significant cost efficiencies lower
131. See id.; Hospital Corp., 807 F.2d at 1391.
132. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 129-30. In addition to contracting for reduced
hospital rates, the managed care organizations have diverted patients away from hospitals to
outpatient facilities, and have mandated shorter hospital stays, resulting in surplus hospital
beds and increased financial strain on hospitals. See id.
133. Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1299.
134. Id.
135.

See

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N,

REVISION

TO HORIZONTAL

MERGER

GUIDELINES

(1997)

(amending only § 4.0 of the 1992 HORIzONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES), reprinted in 1997 FIC
LEXIS 283; Butterworth, 946 F Supp. at 1300.
136. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REVISION TO HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997) (amending
only § 4.0 of the 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES), reprinted in 1997 FIrC LEXIS 283.
137. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300; United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F.
Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr, 983 F. Supp.
121, 137, 146-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F Supp. 968, 987
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operating costs of the merged entity and ultimately benefit
138
consumers by reducing the price charged for healthcare services.
Thus, courts have reasoned that cost efficiencies actually enhance
competition, in that they enable the merged entity to compete more
effectively; cost efficiencies turn two ineffective competitors into
139
one effective competitor.
However, the defendants must establish that the intended merger
itself rather than any other factor would result in the particular
cost efficiencies, and that these cost efficiencies would benefit
consumers. 40 Some of the merger-created efficiencies claimed by
antitrust defendants include reductions in personnel, reduced
laundry costs, reduced costs of laboratory services and medical
supplies, and reduced costs in computer and information
services.'4 ' For example, the defendants in Long Island argued that
the merger would save them ninety-two million dollars in operating
42
costs over a five-year period.
However, one federal court found that the efficiency defense was
insufficient justification for a merger if the hospitals could
successfully create the alleged efficiencies without merging. 43 In
Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,44 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Montana reasoned that
because of excess bed capacity, the hospitals had already
(N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
138.

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REVISION TO HORIZONTrL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1997)

(amending only § 4.0 of the 1992 HORIZON'rAL MERGER GUIDELINES), reprinted in 1997 FTC
LEXIS 283.
139. See CaritionHealth, 707 F Supp. at 849.
140. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 137.
141. See id. at 147-48.
142. Id. at 147.
143. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F Supp.2d 937, 948 (E.D.
Mo. 1998), reversed on other grounds, No. 98-3123, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (8th Cir July
21, 1999). The hospitals argued that they had excess, underutilized beds and were thus
inefficient hospitals. Id. The court responded that inpatient occupancy rates are no longer a
good indicator of hospital efficiency because many hospitals, including the hospitals at issue,
use their empty beds for outpatient services and implement cost-saving measures through
expanded outpatient services and flexible staffing. Id. Thus, the merger would not increase
the efficiency of the merging hospitals. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court on
the grounds that the FTC failed to produce sufficient evidence of the pertinent geographic
market to establish its prima facie case. Tenet Healthcare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at
*21-23. Regarding the efficiency defense, the Eighth Circuit stated that the district court may
have properly rejected the defendants' efficiency defense, but a hospital that is larger and
more efficient than the two previous hospitals would provide better medical care and could
actually enhance competition. Id. at *27.
144. 17 F. Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), reversed on other grounds, No. 98-3123, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (8th Cir. July 21, 1999).
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implemented cost-saving measures by reducing staff and expanding
their outpatient services 45 The district court stated that if the
merger would not create significantly more cost savings for the
merging hospitals, then the alleged efficiency was insufficient to
overcome the FTC's prima facie case that the merger would violate
antitrust laws. 146 Therefore, while government agencies and most
courts recognize the efficiency defense in an antitrust analysis of a
proposed merger, the district court in Tenet Healthcare held that
the defendant can only successfully rebut the FTC's prima facie
case by showing that the merger will create cost savings and
efficiencies that the merging hospitals would be unable to achieve
without the merger, and that these cost savings and efficiencies
1 47
would ultimately benefit consumers.
9.

The State Action Doctrine

The state action doctrine is another factor that courts must
consider in evaluating proposed mergers under antitrust laws.
Under
this
doctrine,
in appropriate
circumstances,
the
anticompetitive conduct of a state or its political subdivision acting
under the authority of the state is immune from antitrust scrutiny
and cannot be enjoined by the FTC or the DOJ. 148 The following
discussion of two cases involving proposed hospital mergers
illustrates this doctrine.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Hospital Board of Directors of
Lee County, 49 the Hospital Board of Directors ("Board") argued
that it was created by the Florida legislature as a non-profit public
organization for the purpose of establishing and operating public
hospitals in Lee County, Florida.' ° The Board, with the authority of
the. Florida legislature, built a new hospital facility and merged it
into the original hospital located in Lee County.'5' The Board then
arranged for the new hospital, known as Lee Memorial Hospital, to
acquire a private, non-profit hospital in Lee County to increase
operating efficiencies and reduce costs. 5 2 The FTC filed a
145.
146.
147.
148.
(11th Cir.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Tenet Healthcare, 17 F Supp.2d at 948.

Id.
Id.
See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Hospital Bd. of Dir. of Lee County, 38 F3d 1184
1994).
38 F3d 1184 (lth Cir. 1994).
Hospital Bd. of Dir, 38 F3d at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186.
Id.
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complaint, alleging the proposed merger violated antitrust laws. 1'
The Board argued that the state action doctrine, which insulates
state governments from antitrust liability for anticompetitive
conduct, immunized it from antitrust scrutiny. 154 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the Board, noting that the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does not apply to
the anticompetitive conduct of a state or of political subdivisions of
the state. 155 Under Supreme Court precedents, in order for the state
action doctrine to protect the Board, it had to show that (1) it was
a political subdivision of the state; 2) the state legislature
authorized the conduct in question; and 3) the state legislature
unambiguously set forth a state policy authorizing such
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1187. The state action doctrine is based on principles of federalism and
state sovereignty. See id. The Board argued that because it was created by Florida's
legislature, it was a political subdivision of the state entitled to immunity from antitrust laws
under the state action doctrine. Id. at 1185-86.
155. Hospital Bd. of Dir., 38 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
351-53 (1943) and Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)). In Parker, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Sherman Act applied to anticompetitive conduct by a
state government. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). California had adopted the
California Agricultural Prorate Act, which restricted the marketing of privately produced
raisins in order to lessen competition among agricultural producers and thus stabilize prices.
Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. The Court refused to apply the Sherman Act to the California
statute, reasoning that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade,
not state action intended to benefit the state's citizens. Id. at 349-53.
In Town of Hailie, the United States Supreme Court extended the Parker doctrine to
insulate the anticompetitive actions of political subdivisions of a state from antitrust laws.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47 (1985). The controversy in Town of
Halie stemmed from a number of townships alleging that the City of Eau Claire violated the
Sherman Act by monopolizing the areas sewage treatment services and refusing to provide
sewage treatment to areas where the landowners did not vote to be annexed by the City.
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41. A state statute provided that a city operating a public utility
could regulate the limits of sewage service in unincorporated areas. Id. The Court noted that
the statute clearly contemplated that a city could engage in anticompetitive conduct. Id. at
41-43. The Court held that Parkerimmunity applied to a city's anticompetitive conduct if it
was sanctioned by a clearly expressed state policy. Id. By "clearly expressed," the Court
noted that the legislature is not required to explicitly state that the political svbdivision may
engaged in anticompetitive practices, but rather that the anticompetitive conduct be a
foreseeable and logical result from the powers granted to the political subdivision by the
statute. Id. The Court did not decide whether a healthcare authority created by the state
legislature was a political subdivision immune from the antitrust laws. Hosp. Bd. of Dir., 38
F3d at 1188. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that a healthcare authority created by the
Alabama Legislature was a political subdivision of the State of Alabama Id. (citing Askew v.
DCH Regional Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033 (11th Cir. 1993)). Based on Askew, the court
in Hospital Board of Directors concluded that the Board was a healthcare authority created
by the Florida legislature for a special purpose and thus was a political subdivision of the
state for the purpose of the state action doctrine. Id.
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anticompetitive conduct. 56 Using these criteria, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the Board was a political subdivision of the state, in that
the Florida legislature created it for a special purpose in Lee
County. 5 7 The court went on to note that the Florida legislature
had authorized the proposed acquisition. 1 8 Finally, the court stated
that a clear articulation of state policy requires only that
anticompetitive conduct be the foreseeable result of the state
legislation authorizing the power given to the Board. 15 9 Because the
Board satisfied all three criteria, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the state action doctrine immunized the Board's
anticompetitive conduct from antitrust liability. 160
The defendant in University Health also argued that it was
immune from antitrust scrutiny due to the state action doctrine. 61
The merging hospitals argued that Georgia's certificate of need law,
which regulates the creation and expansion of hospitals based on
public need, demonstrated a state policy favoring the suppression
of competition in the hospital industry. 62 They also argued that the
logical and foreseeable result of the certificate of need law was the
suppression of all competition in the hospital industry.'16 The court
responded that Georgia's regulation of the hospital industry by
virtue of the statute did not demonstrate an intent to exempt
hospital acquisitions from antitrust laws. 164 The court stated that
such an intent would be more clearly shown if the statute
permitted the regulatory agency to authorize or require the hospital
mergers regardless of their anticompetitive effects. 65 The court
held that the state action doctrine did not apply to the certificate of
need statute to insulate the defendant from antitrust laws. 1
156.
157.

Hospital Bd. of Dir., 38 F.3d at 1187-88 (citing Town of Hattie, 471 U.S. at 34).
Id. at 1188.

158.

Id.

159. Id. at 1188. In analyzing foreseeability, the court stated that it must determine
what the legislature knew about the market and the community at the time it enacted the
relevant statute. Id. at 1192. The court concluded that the Board's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct was reasonably anticipated by the Florida legislature when it gave the Board the
authority to acquire other hospitals. Id.
160. Id. at 1192.
161. Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.13 (11th
Cir. 1991).
162. University Health, 938 F.2d at 1213 n.13.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The regulatory agency here was the Richmond County Hospital Authority,
which had delegated its power to University Health, Inc., the defendant. Id.
166. University Health, 938 F.2d at 1213 n.13.
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The Ultimate Resolution of the Case: Balancing the Equities

By evaluating the many factors discussed above involved in an
antitrust analysis, the ourt must determine whether the FFC
showed a sufficient likelihood that the proposed merger, if
consummated, would violate the antitrust laws. 167 If the defendants
did not sufficiently rebut the Ff C's case, the preliminary injunction
168
prohibiting the proposed merger will be granted.
. The final step a court must take in deciding whether to enjoin
the proposed merger is to balance the equities. 16 9 The court must
weigh the public interests, such as maintaining competitive prices,
strong enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the inherent
difficulties of undoing a merger later found to be unlawful, against
the private interests of the merging hospitals, such as financial
hardships imposed upon the merging hospitals if they are not
allowed to merge. 170 In an antitrust analysis, public interests are
given greater weight than private interests.' 71 However, if the
hospitals' financial hardships are such that they will not survive
absent the merger, then it would be in the public interest to allow
the merger to proceed. 72 In general, though, if the court concludes.
that the public interest in favor of enjoining the proposed merger
outweighs the harm that would result to the defendant hospitals
without the merger, it will grant the preliminary injunction
73
prohibiting the merger.

167. See Federal Trade Comn'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F Supp. 1285, 1301-02
(W.D. Mich. 1996), affd, No. 96-2440, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the FTC showed a likelihood of ultimate success in its case against the merged entities
by raising serious questions regarding the probability that the proposed merger would hurt
consumers by substantially lessening competition.)
168. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302.
169. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp.2d 937, 948 (E.D.
Mo. 1998), reversed on other grounds, No. 98-3123, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (8th Cir. July
21, 1999).
170. See Tenet Healthcare, 17 F Supp.2d at 948.
171. See id. Public interest is afforded greater weight because antitrust laws are
intended to protect consumers. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1225.
172. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 272 (8th Cir. 1995). If
the hospitals could not remain in business, consumers would be harmed by the lack of
hospital services in the area. See id.
173. See Tenet Healthcare, 17 F Supp.2d at 948-49.
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ALL TOGETHER: A HYPOTHETICAL

UPMC currently controls forty-three percent of the Pittsburgh
market for in-patient hospital services. 74 This hypothetical will
suppose that UPMC wants to acquire another facility having a
200-bed capacity and will analyze the process by which UPMC
attempts to get its proposed merger approved under the antitrust
laws.
The Clayton Act requires that UPMC file a premerger notification
with the FrC and the DOJ if the threshold requirements of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act are met.1 75 Once the government agencies
receive UPMC's notification, a statutory waiting period of thirty
days commences, during which the agencies will review the
proposed merger using Horizontal Merger Guidelines as a guide in
determining the merger's effect on competition in the Pittsburgh
market.176
The Pennsylvania Attorney General oversees merger transactions
within Pennsylvania.'7 7 The FTC, DOJ and the attorney general have
prosecutorial discretion to either enjoin the merger, should they
conclude that the merger violates the antitrust laws, or to enter
into a voluntary consent decree with UPMC, conditioning the
approval of the merger on UPMC's agreement to contribute a
portion of the prospective cost savings to consumers and
community health programs. 78 If the government agencies believe
that UPMC's acquisition will violate antitrust laws and no consent
agreement is reached, the FTC (or the DOJ) will file suit in federal
79
court for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the merger.
Once in federal court, the FTC has the burden of proving that
UPMC's acquisition will violate antitrust laws.' s° It must establish a
prima facie case by demonstrating that UPMC, after the merger,
will control an undue share of-the Pittsburgh region's market for
acute care inpatient hospital 'services.' 81 Although the product
market - acute care inpatient hospital services - is relatively easy
to define, the geographic market from which UPMC obtains its
174. See Gaynor & Massey, supra note 4, at Al.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
176. See 1992 HORZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31; 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
177. See Thomas L. Greaney, supra note 21, at 194 n.22; Pennsylvania v. Capital Health
Sys. Servs., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,205, No. CV-95-2096, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20268,
at 2-3 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
178. See CapitalHealth, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20268 at *2-3.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
180. See Butterworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17422 at 5.
181. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1289-90; University Health, 938 F2d at 1218.
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patients is more difficult. The FIPC will attempt to define the
market as narrowly as possible, in order for UPMC to control a
larger portion. UPMC, on the other hand, will attempt to define the
market more broadly, in order to encompass more competitors and
to demonstrate- that its merger will not affect competition. Although
the Elzinga-Hogarty test is the standard test by which the
geographic market is defined, experts from either side, along with
the courts, interpret the data differently. 8 2 The determination of the
relevant geographic market may become a battle of the experts,
necessitating that UPMC carefully scrutinize the quality and
quantity of its expert witnesses to increase the persuasive value of
their testimony to the court.
Even in a narrowly defined market, UPMC has a significant
competitor - the West Penn/Allegheny General Health System,
resulting from the recent merger of West Penn Hospital and its
subsidiaries with Allegheny General Hospital and subsidiaries.'1
Another significant competitor is Mercy Health System, consisting
primarily of Mercy Hospital.'1 4 UPMC's target, a 200-bed facility,
may not be a significant competitor in that market. Most likely, an
acquisition of a 200-bed facility will not affect in any meaningful
way the current relative market shares of UPMC, West Penn/
Allegheny, and Mercy. Because of the level of competition
remaining in the Pittsburgh market after the proposed merger, the
FTC in all probability will be unable to establish its prima facie
case against UPMC. If the IrC does establish its prima facie case,
however, UPMC's most viable defense will be the cost efficiencies
defense. Most federal courts, along with the FC and the DOJ,
recognize this, defense. 18 UPMC could also argue that the hospitals'
182. See, e.g, ,Federal Trade Comm'n v Butterworth Health Corp., 946 E Supp. 1285,
1292 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that once a 75% threshold is reached, the strength of the
proposed market an only be determined after the consideration of all relevant data in the
circumstances, and that often the court will compare the strengths and weaknesses of the
alternate geographi markets proposed by the parties and adopt the stronger one).
183. See Pamela Gaynor, AGH, West Penn Combine to Form New Hospital Network,
PrrrSBURGH PosT-GAzgrE, Aug. 5, 1999, at Al. The new network consists of seven facilities,
with total in-patient beds of 2,200 and 13,000 employees. See id. In comparison, UPMC
consists of 14 facilities, 4,500 inpatient beds and 25,000 employees. See id.
184. See Brenden Sage, Top 50: A Decade of Change, 23. Pittsburgh Mercy Health
System, PrrrSBURGH PoST-GA zm', Mar. 14, 1999, at F6. Last year, Pittsburgh Mercy Health
System merged with Catholic Health East, which operates in 10 eastern states. See id.
Pittsburgh Mercy Health System has 950 inpatient beds and 3,726 employees. See id.; Pamela
Gaynor, Executive in the Spotlight: Time of Adjustment, PrrrSBURGH PosT-GAzErnm, May 16,
1999, at C5.
185. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REVISION To HomoNTAL MERGER 'GUIDELINES (1997),
reprinted in 1997 FTC LEXIS 283 (amendifig only § 4.0 of the 1992 HoRIzoNTAL MERGER
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non-profit status will deter any potential anticompetitive effects,
but the courts do not agree on whether this is a viable defense.18 6
The state action doctrine would not apply, since UPMC is not a
political subdivision of the State of Pennsylvania.
To summarize the hypothetical, should UPMC decide to acquire
another hospital having a 200-bed capacity, it has three avenues
through which it can obtain approval for the merger under antitrust
laws. First, it can enter into a voluntary consent decree with the
Pennsylvania Attorney General or with the FTC. By far, this is
UPMC's best alternative. A voluntary agreement will avoid a
protracted suit in federal court and the resulting litigation costs,
attorneys' fees and expert witness fees. It also satisfies the purpose
of the antitrust laws in passing the cost savings to consumers.
Second, should the FTC file suit for a preliminary injunction,
UPMC can successfully argue that its acquisition of an insignificant
competitor in the Pittsburgh market will not affect the relative
market shares of the large hospitals and thus will not signficantly
lessen competition. Finally, UPMC can argue that the merger will
decrease operating costs of the two systems by eliminating
redundant services, resulting in an increased quality of health care.
Given these options, UPMC would in all probability prevail over
any antitrust challenges.
CONCLUSION

Antitrust analysis is often a complicated and lengthy process.
Merging hospitals must undergo a rigorous pre-merger procedure
with government agencies in order to ensure that their merger will
not lessen competition and hurt consumers. If there is a question
whether the merger will violate antitrust laws, the FTC (or the
DOJ) will intervene in federal court. This requires the courts to
become economic theorists and undertake a complicated economic
analysis to determine whether the proposed merger will hurt
consumers. The courts are often inconsistent in their analysis of
these economic factors. As a result, mergers must be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis.
As of this writing, the United States Supreme Court has not
evaluated a hospital merger under the antitrust laws. However, due
to the economic complexity of antitrust analysis, even a Supreme
GUIDELINES).

186. See, e.g., Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97; United States v. Rockford Mem'l
Corp., 898 F2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Court opinion in such a case may not guarantee consistency in
future case law. The FTC and the DOJ have attempted to insert
some consistency into antitrust analysis by promulgating the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Nevertheless, in order for the
government agencies and the courts to adequately assess the
factors laid out in those guidelines, studies must be performed,
particularly in the health care industry, to determine what level of
market concentration suppresses competition and hurts consumers,
what effect cost efficiencies actually have on competition, and how
non-profit status affects competition. The government agencies and
the courts will remain inconsistent in their evaluation of these
factors until definitive guidelines, resulting from research and
economic studies in the health care industry, can be developed in
order to give the enforcement agencies and the courts adequate
guidance in their evaluation of hospital mergers under the antitrust
laws.
Donna A. Alexander

